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Abstract
We investigate the dynamics in the networks of Japanese corporates and
its interplay with the appointment of female board members. We find that
firms with female board members show homophily with respect to gender and
often have above average profitability. We also find that new appointments
of women are more likely at boards which observe female board members at
other firms to which they are tied by either ownership relations or corporate
board interlocks.
Keywords: board member gender, corporate board interlock, firm
performance, firm networks
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1. Introduction
This paper is about the small group of women on the boards of 4,000
Japanese corporates. We analyze which companies appoint them, and we
investigate what determines the slow but steady growth in the number of
female board members from 2004 until 2013. In particular we argue that
the number of female board member appointments depends to a significant
extend on interaction effects in the practices of connected boards.
The share of female board members in Japan lies around 2 percent with
a slight increase throughout the 10-year period covered by our data set. This
is far below the numbers seen in other western economies. Even in 2017 the
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share of female executives is far away from the goal of 10 percent (or one per
board) as announced by the Japanese government in 2013 (Gender Equality
Bureau Cabinet Office, 2017).
The composition of corporate boards in general has been a subject of re-
search for quite some time. To much surprise, it seems that the composition
of the board is often rather irrelevant for the success of a company, provided
that basic governance practices are met (Dalton and Dalton, 2011). How-
ever, only very few studies actually investigate the gender ratio on corporate
boards (Solimente et al., 2017). The findings on the influence of gender on
performance differ. For example, Kolev (2012) finds that female CEOs under-
perform with respect to shareholder’s returns. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find
that the increase in female board members might have let to less experienced
boards and thus decreased performance. Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008)
however find the opposite effect. With respect to earnings volatility and the
long-run survival of firms Faccio et al. (2016) find positive effects from fe-
male CEOs. Also, while the under-representation of woman on boards might
not be much of an issue in the short run, there is ample evidence that it
influences the pace of innovation within the company (Torchia et al., 2011),
as well as the setting of societal norms and practices within the corporation
and outside of it (see also Page, 2007; Cimpian et al., 2020).
While the appointments of female board members therefore also serve
as an indicator for gender equality and might influence the career paths
of future generations of female executives, the currently appointed board
members also live in a networked environment, where managerial practices,
governance and appointment decisions are influenced by what is observed in
other corporations (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Uzzi, 1996; Branson, 2006).
The interorganizational networks within which managerial practices dif-
fuse are manyfold: they stem from ownership relationships, supply chains,
contacts to customers and ties between the board rooms of corporations (Gu-
lati and Gargiulo, 1999; Provan et al., 2007). Especially the case of corporate
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board interlocks has been analyzed in great detail. While the relationship
between such interlocks and firm performance is debated, there is ample evi-
dence in the literature about the diffusion of practices through such interlocks
(Horton et al., 2012; Zona et al., 2018; Devos et al., 2009; Lamb and Roundy,
2016; Mizruchi, 1996).
For the case of Japan, firm networks have been analyzed from different
perspectives. Firm networks based on production processes have for exam-
ple been analyzed by Krichene et al. (2019), firm conglomerates have been
analyzed by Lincoln et al. (1992) and the interplay of board and owner-
ship networks was analyzed by Raddant and Takahashi (2020). Corporate
governance was for example investigated by Buchanan and Deakin (2009).
However, to our knowledge this is, besides Kubo and Nguyen (2020), the first
large-scale analysis of female board members in Japan.
In the following we will analyze the evolution of the group of female board
members and their networks. Our network-approach is partly motivated by
interdisciplinary studies that have shown that women often tend to connect to
other women more than men to men, presumably due to in-group support.
Additionally, the group of female executives of course forms a minority in
an otherwise male-dominated network, which makes homophily one possible
factor for the appointment of female board members (Karimi et al., 2018;
Bramoull et al., 2012; Mcdowell and Smith, 1992; Jadidi et al., 2017).
We will give an overview about the data and the distribution of mandates
and ties in the board network in section 2. In section 3 we discus the extend
of homophily in the different networks and the centrality of female board
members compared to male ones. We then analyze the determinants of the
number of female board members and the relationship with firm performance
in sections 4 and 5. Finally, we analyze which firms appoint additional fe-
male board members and we show in how far network effects explain these
appointments.
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2. Board members and their networks
2.1. The data
For our analysis we have collected data of all publicly listed companies
in Japan. Most of these are listed at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).
This means that our sample includes all the roughly 1,700 firms of the so-
called first section together with a similar amount of slightly smaller firms.
We combine the data on the composition of corporate boards available from
Toyo Keizai with financial data obtained from Nikkei Needs and Thompson
Reuters Datastream. In particular we use the information on market value,
income, total assets, the business sector, largest shareholders and share holder
composition.
The information on the composition of the board is updated annually
in the middle of the year. Besides the names of the board members we
know their age, gender and and whether they are outside board members or
auditors. The naming and numerical identifiers of board members are unan-
imous within each year, but not necessarily throughout the years. Therefore
we have developed an algorithm that traces the destinies of board members
over time based on parts of their names, date of birth and affiliations.1 The
financial data of the firms is matched using the same yearly frequency.
The basics of the treatment of the board composition data are simple.
For each year we observe a set of board members and a set of firms. Board
members serve on the boards of one or more firms. This creates relationships
(incidences) between the set of board members and the set of firms which
resemble a bi-partite graph. Incidences can be described by positive entries
in the incidence matrix I, where the dimensions of I are given by the number
of firms and the number of board members.
1We have confirmed the validity of this algorithm by manual checks. The only known
limitation of this method is that we may loose traces of board members who exit the data
set and re-appear at a later year at a different company. Manual checks have confirmed
that for the following analysis this effect is negligible.
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From the incidence matrix I we can obtain two different un-directed net-
works by projection. AD = II
′ creates an adjacency matrix for the network of
board members, where positive entries resemble cases where board members
know each other from serving on at least one board together. By multiplying
I ′I = AB we obtain an adjacency matrix that describes the network of the
firms based on board interlocks, our main focus of interest. AB is a square
matrix with as many rows and columns as we have firms in our sample. A
positive entry Aij describes a connection between the firms i and j that is
given by at least one shared board members. In the following we will refer
to this network as the board network.
We have also obtained data that reports the five largest shareholders (and
their exact shareholding) for all of the firms in our sample. This might at first
seem a little restrictive, yet in practice significant influence onto a company
is unlikely to be performed by more than five owners. Also, since this data
is reported from the point of the owned company this still results in a rather
complete picture of the ownership network.
In the following we will refer to the firm networks based on ownership
simply as the ownership networks. The ownership networks differs from the
board networks by the fact that they are directed networks. The densities are
however comparable, the ownership network in 2004 contains 2,574 directed
links and we see a steady increase until 2013 when the network has 3,695
links (see Raddant and Takahashi, 2020, for a more general analysis of this
data set).
Some statistics one these networks are given in table 1. While the overall
share of female board members remains low throughout the sample period we
observe some changes while their number almost doubles. Most noticeably,
the average number of mandates for female board members is catching up
and is finally exceeding the overall average. Female board members are over-
represented in the group of auditors, this finding intensifies over time.
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2.2. Distributions of mandates and degree
The change in the number of mandates of female board members deserves
further attention. In the following we will explore how frequent multiple
mandates occur among female board members and how the distributions
compares to those of male board members. We will also investigate how this
translates to the degree distributions in the board network and thus to the
connectivity of female board members.
Figure 1 gives an overview about the development with respect to multiple
mandates. We show the distributions for the number of mandates in 3-year
intervals. Since female board members appear slightly more often in the
role of the auditor than their male counterparts, we separately report the
distributions that only consider auditors. In general auditors are slightly
more likely to have multiple mandates than the entire population of board
members. For female auditors this only hold in the later years of our data
set. When we compare male and female board members we can clearly
see a catching-up of the female board members in terms of the maximum
of mandates and the relative frequency of mandates. In 2004 there is no
woman with more than 3 mandates, while in 2013 we observe a maximum of
5 (compared to 7 for men). More importantly, in 2013 women are more likely
to have multiple mandates than men (which of course mirrors our observation
from table 1).
The increase in the number of mandates naturally leads to an increase
in connectivity also in the personal network of board members. To illustrate
we plot the degree distributions of male and female board members in figure
2. All these distributions are close to power-law behavior, however, one can
also clearly see that the underlying networks are not prototypical scale-free
graphs. For once, the maximum of connections is clearly limited, likely due to
best practices and corporate governance guidelines about multiple mandates.
Also, for board members with multiple mandates the number of connections
increases step-wise with each board to which they are appointed. This leads
7
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Figure 1: Distributions of mandates
We show the frequncy of the number of mandates on a semi-log scale for male and female
board members. Additionally we show these figure only taking auditors into account. We
observe that the maximum of mandates for female board members increases over time and
that their relative frequency surpasses those of men.
to a relatively high cut-off for the power-law and also some distortions at the
intermediate range of connectivity.
It is however obvious that female board members also catch up to their
male counterparts in terms of connectivity. While the maximum for the
degree is still significantly lower the relative number of highly connected
female board members in 2013 is even higher for women than for men. It is
worth noting that this visible kink is in fact caused by a select few women
who stand out from the still relatively small group of overall female board
members.
In order to quantify the change in these distributions over time we have
estimated the tail exponent for these distributions over time. The alpha for
the fitted power-law distributions are reported in figure 3. For male board
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Figure 2: Degree distributions for male and female board members
The figures show the degree distributions on a log-log scale. The distributions for men show
some power-law behavior, yet the cut-off is rather high and the tail is somewhat dampened.
Although the results for female board members are noisy, a catch-up process in terms of
connectvity is visible.
members the already high alpha is slightly increasing over time, mirroring
the trend of slightly smaller boards and slightly fewer multiple mandates in
general. For female board members we see a trend into the opposite direction,
their degree distribution become more heavy-tailed over time, surpassing
those of their male colleagues.
It is worth noting that such differences in the distributions have also
been analyzed theoretically by Lee et al. (2019) in extensions of the model of
Baraba´si and Albert (1999). These models produce networks with a tail ex-
ponent of 3 in their baseline configuration. However, when different groups
are introduced and when these groups are assigned different levels of ho-
mophily, tail exponents different from 3 will emerge as a result of homophilic
behavior. In these models, a result like in the first years of our data set,
with a higher alpha for the (minority) of women compared to men could be
9
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Figure 3: Estimated alpha parameter for degree distribution of male and female board
members over time.
The figure compares the estimated α assuming a power-law degree distribution. Dotted
lines show the standard error. The results quantitatively confirm that connectivity for
female board members as catched up and in fact overtaken that of men. The process seems
to have temporarilly remversed in 2009 and 2010.
obtained in settings where women have a preference to connect to women
while the majority (of men) does not have any preference. It is therefore
important to analyze if women behave in fact homopholic and if the change
in their alpha is due to changes in this behavior or due to other effects.
3. Network effects
3.1. Homophily
As a next step we will investigate if male and female board members
are connected to each other in an unbiased way or if the ego networks (the
neighborhoods) of man and women differ. In other words, we analyze if
homophily exists.
We will start by look at the personal networks of all board members.
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Figure 4: Homphily in personal networks
The figure shown a comparison of the share of female board members in the ego networks
of men and women compared with the overall share among all board members. It reveales
that female board members connectivity is biased towards being connected to other female
board members.
We know that the percentage of female board members is close to 1 percent
in 2004 and rises to around 2 percent in 2013. This share serves as our
benchmark. If ties between men and women were unbiased we expect that
the average share of women in all the individual ego networks should be
very close to the global share and that they should be identical for men
and women. Figure 4 shows these averages and reveals that female board
members are actually connected to more other female board members than
what their overall share would suggest. The ratio between the expected and
actual share is slightly narrowing over time. For men these shares are almost
identical, the share of female board members is only very narrowly below the
expected value, which is of course also related to the relative group sizes of
men and women.
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Figure 5: Homphily in the board network
The plot shows the average number of female board members in the ego networks of firms
compared with the overall expected value. As networks we consider the board network, as
well as the network towards owners and towards owned firms. We condition each case on
whether at least one female board member is present on the board of the ego-firm. We find
that homophily with repect to the presence of female board members is present also on the
level of firms.
Personal ties in these networks are obviously mostly not made as an
individual decision, they come as a result of membership on the board of a
corporation. It therefore makes sense to search for homophily also on the level
of firms. We can consider three types of network relationships and their firms’
ego networks. First we look at the network between firms based on links in the
board network. Here we look at the average number of female board members
that serve on the boards of firms in the ego networks. We can compare
this figure with the overall expected number of female board members (e.g.,
in 2004 one would expect 0.12 female board members). Further we can
condition this on whether a firm actually has at least one women on its own
board.
We can ask the same question for firms that are linked by shareholding
12
(of at least 2 percent). Here we can distinguish between ego networks that
connect a firm to its owners and those connections that show the ownership
over other firms.2
Figure 5 shows that homophily in fact exists on the level of firms. For all
three ego networks the average number of female board members is higher
among those alters where the ego has a female board member on its board.
For the ownership network these effects seem to depend to some extend on
the hierarchy. There are obviously cases where we see female board members
on the boards of firms that are owned by somebody else. This does however
not necessarily mean that the parent company would also have a female
board member. On the other way around, if already the parent company has
a female board member, chances are that firms in its ownership ego-network
also have a female board members.3
3.2. Centrality
Our findings on the degree distributions and the number of mandates have
hinted into the direction that – although in the minority – some female board
members might have moved into rather central positions in the network in
the last years of our sample period. Their actual centrality in the network of
board members is of course also influenced by the actual firm they work for
and whether the tendency to link to other women influences their relative
position in the network.
We therefore calculate different measures for centrality for all the board
members in our sample and we evaluate if female board members are ade-
quately represented among the most central board members (conditional on
2Since there are firms that are not connected this limits the sample to around 2200 firms
for the analysis of the board network and to around 1300 (750) in the owner (ownership)
network (the exact numbers vary from year to year).
3Since the appearance of female board members is close to a binary event we chose
in figure 5 to report the average number of female board members instead of average
percentages (which would relate to varying board sizes). This implies that the plotted
deviation from the expected number of female board members is not symmetric.
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Figure 6: Centrality of female board members
The plots show a comparison of the number of female board members who are present in
the five top 2% slices of the distributions of degree, eigenvector centrality and betweennes
centrality. For each years we have also plotted their expected number and the standard
error. Although the data is noisy we observe significantly more highly central female board
members after 2011, both with respect to their absolute number as well as with respect to
their relative frequency.
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their overall share). To achieve this we order the board members by cen-
trality score and count how many female board members are present in the
first five 2 percent intervals of these distributions.4 We can then compare
the actual number of top female board members with their expected num-
bers assuming their centrality should be distributed like that of the entire
population. The results are shown in figure 6. Due to the low overall number
of female board members the results are admittedly noisy, nevertheless, by
comparing the results for all the years some trend is visible. When we judge
according to degree centrality or eigencentrality female board members are
mostly underrepresented from 2004–2006. When we compare this with the
years 2011–2013 we observe that the overall level has increased and that in
fact even a peak forms for female board members in the top 2 percent. The
results from betweenness centrality look slightly different. While the general
trend is the same, a small peak is already visible very early. This might
hint at a few female board members that connect groups of board members
which are not well connected otherwise, a finding that is likely related to the
homophilic tendencies that we discussed earlier.
4. Determinants of the number of female board members
We have already mentioned that female board members are more fre-
quently found at firms that provide services or are into trade than say, more
traditional sectors, like mining and construction. While such a classification
in likely to explain the distribution of female board members to some degree
our analysis of the network structure between firms and their boards has also
revealed some regularities that could itself help to understand why certain
firms do have female board members and some others do not. To test the
influence of these network effects on board composition we can estimate the
4Due to the heavy tails of these distributions all board members that are outside the
top 10 percent are basically equally unimportant.
15
year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
N 3767 3849 3943 3887 3767 3672 3595 3543 3532 3545
R2 0.8941 0.8828 0.8717 0.8747 0.8755 0.8668 0.8573 0.8442 0.8304 0.8011
R2f=1 0.0230 0.0338 0.0274 0.0340 0.0417 0.0379 0.0486 0.0593 0.0869 0.1322
disp 1.0601 1.0708 1.0563 1.0487 1.0421 1.0176 1.0274 1.0463 1.0532 1.0375
const -2.3855 -2.2845 -2.2153 -2.2699 -2.2150 -2.1334 -2.1197 -2.0321 -2.0054 -1.8839
(-21.2843) (-21.8646) (-21.7579) (-22.0459) (-21.1004) (-20.6194) (-20.7458) (-20.7789) (-21.3662) (-21.6469)
b. size -0.0097 0.0013 0.0116 0.0088 0.0057 0.0036 0.0121 0.0224 0.0257 0.0344
(-0.7049) (0.1005) (0.9690) (0.7144) (0.4299) (0.2648) (0.9239) (1.7534) (2.2049) (3.3320)
degree -0.1015 -0.0438 -0.1104 -0.1102 -0.1409 -0.0598 -0.0539 -0.0578 0.0223 0.0847
board (-1.4903) (-0.7134) (-1.7919) (-1.7110) (-2.0554) (-0.9086) (-0.8438) (-0.9320) (0.3820) (1.5870)
degree -0.0918 -0.0165 0.0376 0.1788 0.1953 0.1254 0.1288 0.1056 0.1256 0.0831
owner (-0.6214) (-0.1379) (0.3449) (1.8574) (1.9982) (1.3461) (1.4675) (1.2951) (1.6845) (1.2486)
degree -0.8420 -0.8791 -0.7308 -0.6985 -0.7797 -0.7986 -0.7455 -0.7273 -0.7752 -0.7734
ownsh. (-5.3768) (-5.9183) (-5.5117) (-5.1929) (-5.7086) (-6.3669) (-6.2143) (-6.3197) (-6.9469) (-7.3946)
< n > fem 1.1678 1.0570 1.2839 1.1439 1.3094 1.0265 1.0376 1.1667 1.0755 0.9887
board net (5.6676) (6.1437) (8.0031) (7.0344) (8.0742) (6.9430) (7.1847) (8.5191) (8.3224) (8.9032)
< n > fem 1.6201 1.2621 1.0485 1.1264 0.9493 0.9378 0.7827 0.6668 0.7146 0.7119
owner net (4.4267) (3.7377) (3.2129) (4.0486) (3.4977) (3.8465) (3.7464) (3.6636) (4.0270) (4.7518)
< n > fem 1.2501 1.3837 0.4971 0.7906 0.9325 1.1873 1.3334 1.1551 0.9645 1.0685
owsh net (3.2547) (3.9221) (1.1788) (2.4181) (2.5928) (4.5360) (5.9166) (5.5440) (4.9935) (6.6107)
sector 0.7011 0.7458 0.7953 0.8791 0.6437 0.7237 0.7294 0.7878 0.6910 0.5473
Foods (3.1538) (3.7191) (4.0907) (4.5886) (3.0453) (3.6395) (3.7678) (4.3644) (3.9522) (3.4288)
sector 0.2063 -0.0009 -0.0233 0.1376 0.1716 0.2888 0.2921 0.3257 0.3865 0.2920
Chem. (0.8293) (-0.0037) (-0.0972) (0.6221) (0.7874) (1.4337) (1.5255) (1.8168) (2.3325) (1.8991)
sector -0.0388 -0.1111 -0.1600 -0.1440 -0.0521 -0.1024 -0.1534 -0.3901 -0.3995 -0.5925
Machinery (-0.1525) (-0.4517) (-0.6678) (-0.6013) (-0.2261) (-0.4546) (-0.6698) (-1.6422) (-1.7686) (-2.6542)
sector -0.1618 -0.3243 -0.3977 -0.3602 -0.3158 -0.2635 -0.2360 -0.2920 -0.2038 -0.3219
El. Appl. (-0.6646) (-1.3491) (-1.6613) (-1.5046) (-1.3444) (-1.1929) (-1.0895) (-1.3817) (-1.0486) (-1.7752)
sector 0.7807 0.6893 0.6187 0.5942 0.4906 0.4538 0.5022 0.5035 0.4880 0.3056
IT (4.7911) (4.6183) (4.1897) (3.9465) (3.0894) (2.9366) (3.3786) (3.6147) (3.6376) (2.4205)
sector -0.0410 0.1289 0.1157 -0.0125 -0.0154 -0.1265 -0.1117 -0.2226 -0.1878 -0.0490
WS Trade (-0.1981) (0.7099) (0.6488) (-0.0660) (-0.0820) (-0.6609) (-0.5989) (-1.1940) (-1.0634) (-0.3241)
sector 0.8778 0.8489 0.8269 0.8407 0.7335 0.6245 0.6961 0.6787 0.6931 0.6049
R Trade (5.9324) (6.1659) (6.1412) (6.1531) (5.2021) (4.3927) (5.0443) (5.1158) (5.5334) (5.2330)
sector 1.0638 1.0080 0.9580 0.9379 0.9424 0.9070 0.9683 0.8985 0.8635 0.7593
Services (7.2536) (7.3918) (7.2551) (7.0310) (7.0048) (6.9315) (7.5791) (7.2908) (7.3024) (6.9961)
Table 2: Determinants of the number of female board members in a firm.
Results of the Poisson-regression, t-statistics in parenthesis. As the main infuences we
test for connectivity in the board and ownership network (degree), as well as the average
number of female board members in the ego-networks, < n > fem. Further, 8 sector fixed
effects are included to account for industry-specific differences.
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number of female board members in each firm by coding the connectivity
and the exposure to other female board members in the network of firms and
by controlling for known fixed effects by sectoral differences.
Table 2 reports the results of a Poisson regression that tests for the net-
work effects in the following way. First we should take account of the size of
the board in each firm, since the chance of having a female board member
should increase with the number of seats. The variable b. size therefore rep-
resents the difference in the size of a firm’s board from the mean. Further we
test for the influence of connectivity in the board and ownership network by
including three variables for the degree. For the ownership network we con-
sider the in- and out-degree separately (as a logged variable, i.e., log(1+ki)).
We test for the influence of homophily in the networks by accounting for
the average number of female board members that is observed at connected
firms in either the board or ownership network. Further we use 8 dummies,
covering the most populated sectors.5
When we look at the results the first point to take notice of is that the
board size variable starts out with a negative sign and turns to be significantly
positive in the later years. The reason is that many female board members
have initially been hired at smaller firms with smaller boards, it is only
towards the end of our sample period that also large corporations have hired
some female board members (see also Kubo and Nguyen, 2020, for similar
findings). The variable for the degree in the board network (which is mostly
not significant) shows a similar behavior. Since large corporations (with
very few female board members) are the most networked this finding can
be expected. For the ownership network we again find evidence of some
hierarchical influences. Firms that have ownership in many other firms have
5Since in many sectors only very few woman are employed we are limited to the use of
about 8 sector dummies for technical reasons. These 8 dummies however cover 61 percent
of all firms and we have verified that the exact selection of dummy variables does not
influence our findings.
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significantly fewer female board members. The influence of the in-degree
(connected owners) is tendencially reversed, although in this analysis it is
mostly insignificant.
The most important part are of course the variables that describe the av-
erage number of female board members in the three respective ego networks.
They are all positive and highly significant (with one exception for the own-
ership network in 2006). This means that the homophily in the network has
a measurable impact on the board composition: the number of female board
members of a firm is connected to the fact whether female board members are
observed at connected peers. Hence, we find network effects for the presence
of female board members that speak in favor of influences of the network on
the composition of the board with respect to gender.6
5. Performance
From an economic point of view it is of course necessary to investigate if
we can say anything about differences in the performance of firms with and
without female board members. Since we deal with firms from very different
sectors we should analyze this by looking at the return on assets (ROA) as
the most general criterion of performance. Also, since firms from different
sectors will typically have different balance sheet structures, we normalize
this ROA be the sector averages in each year. We can then compare the
firms that have boards with only men to those where at least one women
serves on the board.
For this analysis we use a sub-sample of 1,357 firms for which data is
available for all 10 years. 1,187 of these firms never had a female board
6To investigate the seemingly good fit of the model we have calculated an additional
measure labeled R2f=1 which give the ratio of correct predictions of firms that have exactly
one female board member. It shows that these cases are more difficult to predict than
having no female board members at all. In particular our model predicts on average 0.1996
female board members for firm with no female board members and 0.3199 (0.4519) for
firms with 1(2) female board members.
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Figure 7: Firm profitabilty
The figure compares the ROA of firms with at least 1 female baord member with that of
firms without any female board members. The ROAs have been normalized by the annual
sector averages. Firms with female baord members tend to have a higher ROA than those
without. The dotted lines shows the 99% confidence interval for the ROA of a group with
the size like that of the firms with female board members.
member. We will focus on the 32 firms that have at least one female board
member on average over this time period and compare their performance to
the sample average (we obtain qualitatively very similar results as long as
the average number of female board members is > 0.7).
Our results for this analysis are shown in figure 7. We can see that the
ROA for the majority of firms with entirely male boards is very close to the
overall average. For the firms with at least one female board member we have
numerically determined the 99-percent interval (i.e., the expected range for
the average ROA of a randomly select sub-sample of firms). Interestingly
we find that firms with female board members do perform noticeably better
most of the time. This result is however only significant in the last three
years.
Given that the majority of studies on board composition struggle to es-
tablish any relationship to performance this finding is in fact surprising. It
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should however also not be overstated, there is no reason to draw conclusions
on causality here. It is likely that this finding is related to good governance
in general. Firms that have good governance are more profitable and those
firms might also be better in facilitating the hiring of female board members.
In this respect our results are similar to those of Farrell and Hersch (2005)
who also found women to serve for better performing firms.. The results
also support Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) who found that increasing
the number of female board members is not an issue for firm performance.
Given that the overall number of female board members is still low, it seems
plausible that effects related to inexperienced board members, as described
by Ahern and Dittmar (2012), should not be an issue in the Japanese case.
6. Appointment of female board members
After looking at the networks of existing female board members and firm
performance we have to look at the dynamics of the appointment process.
The aim is to find out if network effects also explain this process and could
therefore be useful for policy advice on gender diversity (a visualization of
appointments in the network is provided in figure A.8 in the appendix).
In order to look at the determinants of female hirings we limit the analysis
to the 1,357 corporations which are present throughout the entire time period
and for which data on earnings and shareholder-ship is available. In the time
period from 2004–2013 218 new female board members have been hired by
179 corporations. We compare the firms which have hired female board
members with those that did not hire any and we analyze in how far network
effects and firm characteristic can explain this behavior.
Table 3 shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent
variable signals the hiring of a female board member (based on the changes
observed in the annual reports). The two firm characteristics that, as we
have seen before, might relate to hiring is the board size and the profitability,
the ROA of the company. We then estimate three versions of this model.
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model only year dummies incl. sectors incl. foreign sh.
MF R2 0.1293 0.1455 0.1470
LR ratio 275.9 310.5 313.6
log L -929.0 -911.8 -910.2
obs. / ones 10820 218 10820 218 10820 218
vars 18 25 26
9 year const • • •
board size 0.0428 (2.72) 0.0488 (3.03) 0.0466 (2.89)
ROA 4.2788 (2.62) 2.9835 (1.76) 2.0992 (1.20)
foreign sh. 1.2164 (1.80)
degree board 0.1931 (1.86) 0.2258 (2.15) 0.2107 (2.00)
degree owner 0.4056 (3.87) 0.4474 (4.19) 0.3979 (3.62)
degree ownsh. -0.7653 (-4.95) -0.8250 (-5.23) -0.7603 (-4.69)
fem. board net 0.6445 (1.88) 0.6222 (1.80) 0.5767 (1.66)
fem. owner net 1.1913 (4.10) 1.2761 (4.35) 1.2806 (4.37)
fem. ownsh. net 1.2522 (3.26) 0.9763 (2.50) 0.9909 (2.53)
existing fem. 1.4977 (7.56) 1.3068 (6.42) 1.3232 (6.50)
Foods 1.2219 (4.36) 1.2649 (4.49)
Chemicals 0.7689 (3.24) 0.7521 (3.17)
Pharmac. 1.0618 (2.61) 1.0625 (2.63)
IT 0.6379 (2.19) 0.6738 (2.30)
WHS Trade 0.7148 (3.15) 0.7443 (3.27)
RT Trade 0.6232 (1.83) 0.6715 (1.97)
Services 0.9886 (3.39) 1.0547 (3.60)
Table 3: Determinants of new female board members.
The table shows results of the logistic regression, t-statistics in parentheses. We compare
the characteristics of firms with respect to wheater they hire an additional female baord
member in the period from 2004–2013. We estimate three models that differ by the in-
clusion of sector-fixed effects and a variable that represents foreign share holdings. We
find that, besides sector-specific differences, the relative position in the ownership network
as well as the presence of other female board members at the boards of connected firms
significantly influence the appoitment of female board members.
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The left columns show the results with fixed effects for the different years
only. The middle columns adds fixed effects for sectors.7 The two rightmost
columns also include the effects of foreign shareholder-ship.
All three versions contain data on the number of connections in the board
network, the in- and out-degree in the ownership network and the average
number of observed female board members in the respective ego-networks,8
formatted in the same way as described in section 4. Additionally we account
for the case that some firms might already have a female board member and
hire another one. This is accounted for by the existing fem variable.
At a first glance it looks that our model explains some variation in the
data but certainly not all of it. We can therefore have a look at the conditional
in-sample prediction accuracy. On the basis of events we can check if the 218
events that our model classifies as the most likely to lead to an appointment
actually do so. While the probability for all events is 2.01 percent, the top
218 predictions turn out to be correct in 24.31 percent of the cases. We can
also ask the same question on the level of firms and take as given that the
appointments have taken place at 179 firms and check if the 179 firms that
our model predicts to be the most likely ones associated with an appointment
do hire at least one female board member. What we find is that while the
unconditional probability to hire a female board members among all firms is
13.19 percent, the 179 firm predicted by the model are correct 18.99 percent
of the time. (Since firms that do not hire appear in the sample each year
7Also here, the low number of female board members limits the possible number of
sector dummy variables. We have included the most populated sectors with the most
hirings. We have verified that the results do not depend on the exact choice of sectors, in
particular we have also estimated the model with the exact same set of sector dummies as
in table 2 and found no significant difference in the results. Our choice of sectors differs
partly from the model presented in section 4 since here we look at differences in the change
of female board membership whilst we looked at differences in levels before.
8Effectively, we are looking at 9 transition from year t to t+ 1. When we observe the
appointment of a female board in the annual report published in t + 1 we relate this to
the characteristics of the firm in year t since this is the year in which the appointment was
most likely decided upon.
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and those that do only appear when they hire, these two figures differ.)
The results show that network effects are significantly related to the ap-
pointment of female board members. The results are robust to the use of
sector dummies. The seven network variables are all significant, four of them
even at the α < 1 % level. The influences are weaker in the board network
than in the ownership network. In the latter we observe a similar hierarchi-
cal pattern as before, companies which have some control over others (degree
ownsh.) tend to have fewer female board members. This effect can however
be weakened if those controlled companies do have female board members
(fem. ownsh. net). Companies with an existing female board members are
always more likely to appoint additional ones.
We can follow up on our previous observations about profitability by
looking at the ROA. While its coefficient is positive in all three models, we
also observe that by including the share of foreign shareholding the effect is no
longer significant. One can argue that foreign sh. can serve as a proxy for a
corporations’ openness to modern (’western’) corporate governance practices
although it is also slightly correlated to the size of firms in general. However,
the results for ROA and foreign sh. hint into the expected direction that
besides network effects governance is of course related to both performance
and the composition of the board.
7. Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that even if the number of female board members
in Japan is still low, they have started to change their position in the net-
works of executives. Relatively many female board members have multiple
mandates, which made them become more central.
Network effects play an important role in explaining the gender ratio of
corporate boards and they are also an important aspect of new appointments.
New female board members are often appointed when connected firms also
have at least one female board member. In ownership networks this effect
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is hierarchical. The effect of female hirings on performance is tendencially
positive.
What remains to be investigated is if the network effects among (mini-
mally) diversified boards will continue to work in favor of a further increase
in gender equality. From a theoretical point of view one should probably
avoid too homophilic structures, since these could shield conservative sectors
from change and would thus limit the relative centrality and thus influence
of female executives.
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Appendix A. Female board members over time
2004 2013
sector firms b. m. female b.m. share firms b. m. female b.m. share
Insurance 11 179 6 0.0335 12 147 12 0.0816
Services 325 3463 88 0.0254 359 3612 148 0.0410
Air Transportation 6 82 0 0 6 74 3 0.0405
Electric Power and Gas 25 470 7 0.0149 23 366 14 0.0382
Oil and Coal Prod. 13 172 1 0.0058 13 163 6 0.0368
Retail Trade 375 4163 85 0.0204 342 3617 121 0.0335
Rubber Products 21 260 2 0.0077 19 221 7 0.0317
Foods 157 1988 25 0.0126 131 1563 48 0.0307
Fishery, Agric. For. 11 146 3 0.0205 11 135 4 0.0296
Real Estate 110 1172 24 0.0205 111 1084 30 0.0277
Pharmaceutical 54 651 7 0.0108 61 698 18 0.0258
Information and Comm. 306 3301 63 0.0191 349 3517 89 0.0253
Other Financing B. 55 648 7 0.0108 32 381 8 0.0210
Chemicals 216 2707 19 0.0070 215 2496 52 0.0208
Banks 96 1382 2 0.0014 93 1408 29 0.0206
2013 average 0.0194
Textiles App. 87 987 7 0.0071 56 625 11 0.0176
Securities and Com. F. 42 506 2 0.0040 40 414 7 0.0170
Precision Instruments 51 575 3 0.0052 50 560 9 0.0161
Other Products 111 1345 13 0.0100 109 1202 19 0.0158
Glass and Cer. 72 809 4 0.0049 62 661 10 0.0151
Wholesale Trade 375 4319 31 0.0072 343 3656 54 0.0148
Pulp and Paper 29 366 1 0.0027 26 303 4 0.0132
Electric Appl. 305 3676 20 0.0054 273 3066 35 0.0114
Land Transportation 70 1038 4 0.0039 65 930 9 0.0097
Warehousing and H. T. 43 573 1 0.0017 41 519 5 0.0096
Machinery 249 2951 18 0.0061 230 2563 22 0.0086
Metal Products 100 1143 3 0.0026 91 976 8 0.0082
Nonferrous Metals 39 458 0 0 36 394 3 0.0076
Transportation Eq. 106 1545 4 0.0026 100 1225 9 0.0073
Construction 223 2945 5 0.0017 174 2075 12 0.0058
Marine Transportation 19 249 1 0.0040 16 188 1 0.0053
Iron and Steel 56 732 2 0.0027 49 568 3 0.0053
Mining 9 118 1 0.0085 7 96 0 0
Table A.4: Female board members by sector
We compare the number of female board members in 2004 and 2013. The
rows are sorted by the sector-average in 2013.
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TOKYO ENERGY...
TOENEC
KODENSHA
SUMITOMO DEN...
NIPPON DENSE...
KYOWA EXEO
SHIN-NIPPON ...
NIPPON KOEI
NDS
KYUDENKO
SANYO ENGR. ...
SANKI ENGINE...
JGC
CHUGAI RO CO
TECHNO RYOWA
TAKADA
YAMATO
TAKASAGO THE...
NEC NETWORKS...
ASAHI KOGYOSHA
TOSHIBA PLAN...
HOKURIKU DEN...
NIPPON FLOUR...
NISSHIN SEIFUN
NITTO FUJI F...
SHOWA SANGYO
MASUDA FLOUR...
CHUBU SHIRYO
NICHIWA SANGYO
TOYO SUGAR R...
MITSUI SUGAR
ENSUIKO SUGA...
FUJI NIHON S...
MORINAGA
NAKAMURAYA
EZAKI GLICO
KAMEDA SEIKA
MORINAGA MIL...
YAKULT HONSHA
PRIMA MEAT P...
NH FOODS
HAYASHIKANE ...
MARUDAI FOOD
NS SOLUTIONS
SOHGO SECURI...
YASKAWA INFO...
CORE
KAKAKU.COM
I'ROM HOLDINGS
SCINEX
TAKARA HDG.
KEY COFFEE
NISSHIN OILLIO
FUJI OIL
BOSO OIL   FAT
J-OIL MILLS
TAKACHIHO KO...
ELEMATEC
KITAMURA
JALUX
ARATA
TOMEN DEVICE
JP-HOLDINGS
SOJITZ
ALFRESA HOLD...
KIKKOMAN
AJINOMOTO
HOUSE SHOKUH...
KAGOME
YAIZU SUISAN...
ARIAKE JAPAN
PIETRO
EBARA FOODS ...
NICHIREI
TOYO SUISAN ...
NIHON SHOKUH...
ISHII FOOD
NISSIN FOODS...
NAGATANIEN
TAIYO KAGAKU...
ASAHIMATSU F...
JAPAN TOBACCO
KENKO MAYONN...
NATORI
GUNZE
SHINYEI KAISHA
BANNERS
TOYOBO
UNITIKA
NISSHINBO HO...
DAIWABO HOLD...
SHIKIBO
NITTO BOSEKI
OMIKENSHI
OAK CAPITAL
TOYOTA BOSHOKU
SAIBO
SHINNAIGAI T...
DAITO WOOLEN...
DAIDOH
NIHON SEIMA
BOOKOFF
NIPPON COKE ...
TEIJIN
TORAY INDS.
KURARAY
ASAHI KASEI
SAKAI OVEX
KITANIHON SP...
KFC
MARUJUN CO.,...
MIYAJI ENGR....
ALPHA
NIPPON FELT
ICHIKAWA
ECONACH HOLD...
ASHIMORI IND...
ATSUGI
DYNIC
KYOWA LEATHE...
SEIREN
SOTOH
KOMATSU SEIREN
AUBEX
WACOAL HDG.
FUJIX
OJI HOLDINGS
MITSUBISHI P...
HOKUETSU KIS...
CHUETSU PULP...
TOMOEGAWA PA...
DAIO PAPER
RENGO
OHISHI SANGY...
TOMOKU
CHUOH PACK I...
SUMITOMO CHE...
SUMITOMO SEI...
TAYCA
ISHIHARA SAN...
KATAKURA CHI...
TOSOH
TOKUYAMA
CENTRAL GLASS
DAISO
KANTO DENKA ...
DENKI KAGAKU...
IBIDEN
SHIN-ETSU CH...
NIPPON CARBI...
SAKAI CHEMIC...
AIR WATER
TAIYO NIPPON...
TOHO ACETYLENE
NIHON PARKER...
KOATSU GAS K...
SHIKOKU CHEM...
TODA KOGYO
HODOGAYA CHE...
TAOKA CHEMICAL
NIPPON SHOKU...
HONSHU CHEMI...
DAINICHISEIK...
KANEKA
MITSUBISHI G...
MITSUI CHEMI...
J S R
TOKYO OHKA K...
DAICEL
SUMITOMO BAK...
SEKISUI CHEM...
ZEON
AICA KOGYO
UBE INDUSTRIES
SEKISUI JUSHI
TAKIRON
ASAHI ORGANI...
HITACHI CHEM...
RIKEN TECHNOS
KODAMA CHEMI...
LONSEAL
SEKISUI PLAS...
GUN-EI CHEMI...
HIMACS
AMUSE
NOMURA RESEA...
DENTSU
INTAGE HOLDI...
PIA
SEIRYO ELEC.
SECOM JOSHIN...
KOEI CHEMICAL
ADEKA
NOF
NEW JAPAN CH...
TOHO CHEMICA...
HARIMA CHEMI...
KAO
DAI-ICHI KOG...
NICCA CHEMIC...
SANYO CHEMIC...
TAKEDA PHARM...
ASTELLAS PHA...
SUMITOMO DAI...
SHIONOGI
MITSUBISHI T...
ASKA PHARM.
KAKEN PHARMA...
EISAI
MORISHITA JI...
RIKEN VITAMIN
ROHTO PHARMA...
ONO PHARM.
MOCHIDA PHARM.
SANTEN PHARM.
TERUMO
SEIKAGAKU
EIKEN CHEMICAL
TOWA PHARMS.
ZERIA PHARM.
DAI NIPPON T...
NIPPON PAINT...
KANSAI PAINT
SHINTO PAINT
CHUGOKU MARI...
NIHON TOKUSH...
DIC
SAKATA INX
TOYO INK SC ...
TOKYO PRINTI...
SANIX
ORIENTAL LAND
FUJI MEDIA H...
OBIC
JUSTSYSTEMS
YAHOO JAPAN
MYSTAR ENGIN...
WATABE WEDDING
MOSHI MOSHI ...
INFO.DEV.
SOFTBANK TEC...
USS
ITOCHU TECHN...
SAKURA KCS
SOGO MEDICAL
INFO.SVS.INTL.
NEXTWARE
EM SYSTEMS
TOYO BUS.ENGR.
PADO
WOWOW
FUJIFILM HOL...
KONICA MINOLTA
SHISEIDO
MANDOM
FANCL
KOSE
ST
KONISHI
SEIKO PMC
KOBAYASHI PH...
TERAOKA SEIS...
SHOWA CHEMIC...
FUMAKILLA
CEMEDINE
FUJI KOSAN
NICHIREKI
FUJI OIL
SHOWA HOLDINGS
TOYO TIRE   ...
OKAMOTO INDU...
ACHILLES
NISHIKAWA RU...
SAKURA RUBBER
SUMITOMO RIKOBANDO CHEMIC...
NIPPON SHEET...
ISHIZUKA GLASS
NIHON YAMAMU...
NIPPON ELEC....
SUMITOMO OSA...
TAIHEIYO CEM...
NOZAWA
RESORT SOLUT...
NIPPON HUME
NIPPON CONCR...
MITANI SEKISAN
GEOSTR
SEC CARBON
NORITAKE
TOTO
NGK INSULATORS
NGK SPARK PLUG
SHINAGAWA RE...
KROSAKI HARIMA
NIPPON CRUCI...
ISOLITE INSU...
TYK
FUJIMI
A   A MATERIAL
NIPPON STL. ...
KOBE STEEL
NAKAYAMA STL...
GODO STEEL
JFE HOLDINGS
YAMATO KOGYO
TOKYO TEKKO
HOKUETSU METAL
OSAKA STEEL
YODOGAWA STE...
TOYO KOHAN
TAKASAGO TEKKO
CHUBU STEEL ...
MARUICHI STE...
DAIDO STEEL
NIPPON KOSHU...
NIPPON YAKIN...
SANYO SPECIA...
AICHI STEEL
TOHOKU STEEL
HITACHI METALS
NIPPON KINZOKU
PACIFIC METALS
KURIMOTO
CHUO MALLEAB...
NIPPON CHUZO...
NIPPON CHUTE...
JAPAN STEEL ...
MITSUBISHI S...
NICHIA STEEL...
NIPPON SEISEN
SHINKO WIRE
SANYU
MITSUI MNG. ...
MITSUBISHI M...
SUMITOMO MET...
DOWA HDG.
FURUKAWA
TOHO TITANIUM
NIHON SEIKO
NIPPON SHINDO
CK SAN-ETSU ...
FURUKAWA ELE...
SUMITOMO ELE...
SWCC SHOWA H...
TOTOKU ELECT...
TATSUTA ELEC...
ONAMBA
RYOBI
AHRESTY
TOYO SEIKAN ...
HOKKAN HDG.
CORONA
YOKOGAWA BRI...
KOMAIHALTEC
TAKIGAMI STE...
SANWA HOLDINGS
BUNKA SHUTTER
ALINCO
TOYO SHUTTER
LIXIL GROUP
FUJISASH
RINNAI
UNIPRES
AMATEI
SHOWA MANUFA...
YAMASHINA
TOSO
FUJIMAK
TOAMI
CHUGOKUKOGYO
NETUREN
TOKYO ROPE M...
KANEFUSA
SUNCALL
H-ONE
NHK SPRING
CHUO SPRING
FINE SINTER
TAKUMA
NIKKI
TSUGAMI
OKUMA
TOSHIBA MACH...
TAKISAWA MAC...
OKAMOTO MACH...
FUJI MACHINE...
MAKINO MILL....
KOIKE SANSO ...
DMG MORI
SEIBU ELEC. ...
DISCO
TOYOTA INDS.
HOWA MACHINERY
OKK
ISHIKAWA SEI...
TOYO MCH. ME...
ENSHU
SHIMA SEIKI ...
HIRANO TECSEED
NABTESCO
NISSEI
OILES
SATO HOLDINGS
KOBELCO ECO-...
KOMATSU
SUMITOMO HEA...
HITACHI CON....
TOWA
KUBOTA
TOYO ENGINEE...
MITSUB.KAKOK...
TSUKISHIMA K...
TEIKOKU ELEC...
MEIJI MACHINE
SINTOKOGIO
AICHI
KOMORI
SUMITOMO PRE...
SANSEI TECHN...
EBARA
ISHII IRON W...
TORISHIMA PU...
DMW
CHIYODA
DAIKIN INDUS...
ORGANO
TOYO KANETSU
KURITA WATER...
TSUBAKIMOTO ...
NIKKISO
KIMURA CHEMI...
SHINKO PLANT...
TRINITY INDU...
DAIFUKU
YAMADA
YUKEN KOGYO
TADANO
FUJITEC
CKD
RISO KAGAKU
MARS ENGINEE...
JANOME SEWIN...
BROTHER INDU...
GLORY
NIPPON PISTO...
TPR
TAIHO KOGYO
NSK
NTN
JTEKT
THK
YUSHIN PRECN...
MAEZAWA KYUS...
EAGLE INDUSTRY
NIPPON PILLA...
KITZ
HITACHI
TOSHIBA
MITSUBISHI E...
FUJI ELECTRIC
YASKAWA ELEC...
SINFONIA TEC...
MEIDENSHA
SANYO DENKI
DENYO
SANOH INDL.
MAKITA
TOSHIBA TEC
SHIBAURA MEC...
NISHISHIBA E... NIDEC
DAIHEN
AICHI ELECTR...
TABUCHI ELEC.
NISSIN ELECT...
TOGAMI ELECT...
OMRON
NITTO KOGYO
IDEC
TOYO ELECTRI...
GS YUASA
SAXA HOLDINGS
NEC
FUJITSU
OKI ELECTRIC...
DENKI KOGYO
SANKEN ELECT...
MEISEI ELECT...
NAKAYO
AIPHONE
FUJITSU COMPN.
RENESAS ELEC...
SEIKO EPSON
WACOM
EIZO
NIPPON SIGNAL
DAIDO SIGNAL
NOHMI BOSAI
HOCHIKI SEIWA ELECTR...
JAPAN RADIO
PANASONIC
SHARP
ANRITSU
FUJITSU GENE...
HITACHI KOKU...
SONY
TDK
ALPS ELECTRIC
IKEGAMI TSUS...
TOKYO COSMOS...
PIONEER
TB GROUP
NIHON TRIM
ROLAND DG
FOSTER ELECT...
CLARION
SMK
TEAC
HIROSE ELECT...
JAPAN AVNS.E...
UNIDEN HOLDI...
ALPINE ELECT...
HONDA TSUSHI...
FUNAI ELECTRIC
YOKOGAWA ELE...
SHINDENGEN E...
AZBIL
DKK TOA
CHINO
ADVANTEST
ESPEC
KEYENCE
MEGACHIPS
KYODEN
SANSHA ELECT...
KITAGAWA IND...
ASTI
SAWAFUJI ELE...
DENSO
IRISO ELECTR...
NEW JAPAN RA...
STANLEY ELEC...
USHIO
OKAYA ELECTR...
HELIOS TECHN...
FURUKAWA BAT...
SOSHIN ELECT...
YAMAICHI ELTN.
FUJITSU FRON...
NIPPON AVION...
ZUKEN
JEOL
FANUC
FDK
ROHMSHINKO ELEC....
KYOCERA
KYOEI SANGYO
MURATA MANUF...
FUTABA
NITTO DENKO
HOKURIKU ELE...
SHIZUKI ELEC...
TOKAI RIKA
NIPPON TUNGS...
MITSUI ENGR....
HITACHI ZOSEN
MITSUBISHI H...
KAWASAKI HEA...
IHI
NAMURA SHIPB...
NAIKAI ZOSEN
NITCHITSU
NIPPON SHARYO
MITSUB.NICHI...
KINKI SHARYO
NISSAN MOTOR
ISUZU MOTORS
TOYOTA MOTOR
HINO MOTORS
MITSUBISHI M...
F-TECH
MUSASHI SEIM...
NISSAN SHATAI
SHINMAYWA IN...
NISSIN KOGYO
TOPY INDUSTR...
TOKYO RADIAT...
AKEBONO BRAK...
TACHI-S
NOK
FUTABA INDUS...
KAYABA INDUS...
ICHIKOH INDU...
DAIDO METAL
PRESS KOGYO
MIKUNI
OWARI PRECIS...
PACIFIC INDL.
KEIHIN
UNIVANCE
KASAI KOGYO
AISIN SEIKI
FUJI KIKO
MAZDA MOTOR
IMASEN ELECT...
HONDA MOTOR
SUZUKI MOTOR
FUJI HEAVY I...
YASUNAGA
SHOWA
KOITO MANUFA...
TBK
EXEDY
TOYODA GOSEI
AISAN INDUSTRY
NIPPON SEIKI
NIHON PLAST
YOROZU
FCC
FUJI OOZX
ARAYA INDUST...
SHOWA AIRCRA...
JAMCO
NOJIMA
HAKUTO
PARIS MIKI H...
DAIICHIKOSHO
MEDIPAL HOLD...
ADVAN
SPK
HAGIWARA ELE...
ALBIS
SUZUDEN
KOHSOKU
TAKEBISHI
KOJIMA
NET ONE SYST...
RIX
MARUBUN
DAISUI
ZENSHO HOLDI...
MANSEI
HASHIMOTO SO...
EXCEL
VT HOLDINGS
ARGO GRAPHICS
CARCHS HOLDI...
PC DEPOT
HAKUDO
SHIMADZU
JMS
KAWASUMI LABS.
GL SCIENCES
NAGANO KEIKI
V TECHNOLOGY
TOKYO KEIKI
AICHI TOKEI ...
OVAL
TOKYO SEIMITSU
NIKON
TOPCON
OLYMPUS
SCREEN HOLDI...
HOYA
SEED
NORITSU KOKI
A D
RICOH
SEKONIC HOLD...
CITIZEN HDG.
JECO
RHYTHM WATCH
MARVELOUS
AVEX GROUP H...
TOPPAN FORMS
TOMY
KOSAIDO
FUKUVI CHM. ...
LEC
TAKANO
PRONEXUS
NAGOYA LUMBE...
DAIKEN
TOPPAN PRINT...
DAI NIPPON P...
TOSHO PRINTING
KYODO PRINTING
NISSHA PRINT...
MITSUMURA PR...
FUJIMORI KOGYO
ASICS
JSP
NICHIHA
COMANY
FP
YAMAHA
KAWAI MSL.IN...
CLEANUP
KANEMATSU-NNK
LINTEC
SHIN-ETSU PO...
NINTENDO
SHOFU
TAKARA STAND...
NAKABAYASHI
NIFCO
GLOBERIDE
MAMIYA-OP
OKAMURA
NIPPON VALQU...
MUTOH HDG.
ITOCHU
MARUBENI
SCROLL
YUASA FUNASH...
TAKASHIMA
NAGASE
CHORI
TOYOTA TSUSHO
KANEMATSU
DAIKO DENSHI...
CHUO GYORUI
MITSUI
JAPAN PULP  ...
TOKYO ELECTRON
HITACHI HIGH...
TOHTO SUISAN
TSUKIJI UOIC...
OUG HOLDINGS
STARZEN
MARUFUJI SHE...
SEIKO HOLDINGS
TSUBAKIMOTO ...
SUMITOMONIHON UNISYS
MITSUBISHI
DAIICHI JITS...
SEIKA
SATO SHOJI
MITANI
TOKAI ELECTR...
YUASA TRADING
SHINSHO
HANWA
KANADEN
RYODEN TRADING
NARASAKI SAN...
NIPRO
IWATANI
NICHIMO
KYOKUTO BOEK...
KANEMATSU EL... SAN-AI OIL
INABATA   CO...
GSI CREOS
MEIWA
KUWAZAWA TRA...
YAMAE HISANO...
GOLDWIN
DESCENTE
MOONBAT
CENTRAL AUTO...
TOHO HOLDINGS
SINANEN
ITOCHU ENEX
ZETT
SANRIO
SUN-WA TECHNOS
SHINKO SHOJI
DENKYOSHA
SANSHIN ELEC...
TSUZUKI DENKI
TACHIBANA EL...
NIPPON GAS
YAMANAKA CO....
KOMERI
RIKEI
MARUICHI CO....
H2O RETAILING
TECHNO ASSOCIE
CREDIT SAISON
XEBIO
K'S HOLDINGS
NISSAN TOKYO...
CENTURY TOKY...
SBI HDG.
JAPAN SECS.F...
RICOH LEASING
ACOM
ORIENT
HITACHI CAPI...
ORIX
MITSUB.UFJ L...
JAFCO
KYUSHU LEASI...
DAIKO CLEARI...
AKATSUKI FIN...
KOBAYASHI YOKO
MITSUI FUDOSAN
MITSUBISHI E...
HEIWA REAL E...
DAIBIRU
KEIHANSHIN B...
SUMITOMO REA...
TAIHEIYO KOU...
DAIKYO
TOC
LEOPALACE21
FUJI
AIRPORT FACI...
GOLDCREST
TAKARA LEBEN
TOBU RAILWAY
SOTETSU HOLD...
TOKYU
KEIKYU
ODAKYU ELECT...
KEIO
KEISEI ELEC....
FUJI KYUKO
SHIN-KEISEI ...
EAST JAPAN R...
WEST JAPAN R...
CENTRAL JAPA...
NISHI-NIPPON...
HIROSHIMA EL...
DAIICHIKOUTS...
HAMAKYOREX
KINTETSU GRO...
HANKYU HANSH...
NANKAI ELEC....
KEIHAN ELEC....
KOBE ELEC.RA...
NAGOYA RAILR...
KEIFUKU ELEC...
SANYO ELEC.R...
ALPS LOGISTICS
TRANCOM
NIPPON EXPRESS
YAMATO HDG.
SANKYU
MARUWN
SENKO
TONAMI HOLDI...
NIPPON KONPO...
JAPAN OIL TR...
FUKUYAMA TRA...
SEINO HDG.
MEITETSU TRA...
KANAGAWA CHU...
DAIWA MOTOR ...
SHINKI BUS
HITACHI TRAN...
NIPPON YUSEN...
MITSUI OSK L...
KAWASAKI KIS...
NS UNITED KA...
MEIJI SHIPPING
IINO KAIUN K...
TAMAI STEAMS...
KYOEI TANKER
KURIBAYASHI ...
KAWASAKI KIN...
TOKYO KISEN
ANA HOLDINGS
PASCO
MITSUBISHI L...
MITSUI SOKO
SUMITOMO WAR...
SHIBUSAWA WA...
YAMATANE
SUGIMURA WHSE.
ASAGAMI
KEIHIN
ASIA ALLIANC...
CHUO WAREHOUSE
YASUDA WAREH...
RINKO
MEIKO TRANS ...
UTOC
ISEWAN TERMI...
SUZUYO SHINW...
TRADIA
KIMURA UNITY
KINTETSU WOR...
TOKYO BCAST....
CHUBU-NIPPON...
NIPPON TELEV...
ASAHI BROADC...
RKB MAINICHI...
TV ASAHI HOL...
NIPPON TELG....
KDDI
NTT DOCOMO INC
ZENRIN
SHOBUNSHA PU...
IMPRESS HDG.
TOKYO ELECTR...
CHUBU ELEC.P...
KANSAI ELECT...
CHUGOKU ELEC...
HOKURIKU ELE...
TOHOKU ELECT...
SHIKOKU ELEC...
KYUSHU ELEC....
HOKKAIDO ELE...
TOKYO GAS
OSAKA GAS
TOHO GAS
HOKKAIDO GAS
HIROSHIMA GAS
SAIBU GAS
TOEI
NTT DATA
SAN HOLDINGS
PCA
TOKYO THEATRES
NAKANIHON KO...
BUSINESS BRA...
MISONOZA THE...
YOMIURI LAND
JOBAN KOSAN
SQUARE ENIX ...
TOYO TEC
CAPCOM
JAPAN AIRPOR...
IMPERIAL HOTEL
NCS A
ROYAL HOTEL
TRANS COSMOS
SCSK
NIPPON KANZAI
SECOM
NIPPON SYSTE...
INES
NSD
SHINGAKUKAI
TOKAI LEASE
MARUBENI CON...
KONAMI
GAKKYUSHA
BENESSE HOLD...
NIPPON STEEL...
AUTOBACS SEVEN
PARKER
INNOTECH
JBCC HOLDINGS
JK HOLDINGS
KANSAI SUPER...
MIROKU JYOHO...
KITAZAWA SAN...
INABA DENKIS...
OHSHO FOOD S...
VALOR
VITEC
TOTECH
MISUMI GROUP
SAKAI TRADING
SHOKUBUN
SOFTBANK GROUP
SUZUKEN
YAMAYA
RENESAS EASTON
Figure A.8: Female board members in the corporate network
Links resemble connectivity on the board and ownership network within the period 2004–
2013. Nodes (firms) that appear white do not have any female board member. Nodes in
shades of grey have appointent at least one female board member, the node is the darker
the earlier the appointment took place.
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